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(Resumen) 
En vista de la importancia que se concede en muchas versiones del conflicto 
hispamo-americano de 1898 al papel de la opinión pública, este artículo analiza las 
divergencias interpretativas en la reciente historiografía española en torno a las 
relaciones entre opinión pública, prensa y la toma de decisiones políticas conducentes 
a la guerra, al objeto de reflexionar sobre el ejercicio del poder político y la atribución 
de responsabilidades históricas. 
When Spain declared war against the United States in April of 1898, Prime 
Minister Sagasta justified his decisión by saying: "The government has done no more than 
foUow the imperious current of opinión." Similarly Senator Lodge affirmed: "It was this 
public sentiment that drove Congress forward to meet the popular will, which members 
and Senators very well knew could be fulfiUed by war and in no other way." ' 
These statements immediately pose problems of grave and permanent historical 
importance concerning the relationship between public opinión and political decisions, 
the ways and means by which public opinión is formed and makes itself heard, the role 
of poUtical leadership in democratic regimes, and the ways in which the ¡dea of popular 
pressure is used by politicians and historians alike to explain or justify government 
actions. 
Almost all versions of the Spanish-American conflict of 1898 stress the 
importance of public opinión and the press, and their connection with the political 
decisions leading to the war. Robles (1991, 33) for example, states that "public opinión 
forced the government to accept the war", thus accepting Sagasta's explanation of his 
actions, but Salas Larrazábal (1988, 5%) flatly rejects Sagasta's attempt to shirk his 
responsibility during the crisis of 1898, maintaining instead that political leaders have a 
duty to inform and channel public opinión, at the same time as they must resist popular 
pressure in favour of politically unsound decisions. These same issues are cunningly 
dissected by Louis Pérez (1989), in connection with the way in which the sinking of the 
1. Lodge, Henry Cabot. TJie War with Spain. New York, 1899, p. 32. 
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Maine was received by American public opinión and has since been narrated in 
American histories of the war of 1898. 
The growing influence of the press and public opinión in contemporsiry politics 
would appear to be beyond all doubt, but there does seem to be considerable confusión 
both as to the nature and the efficacy of the connections. 
One view, for example, holds that in this aspect the American and Spanish cases 
were dissimilar, suggesting that while the American press contributed to form populsu* 
ideology in 1898, by contrast, the Spanish press exerted less influence and was little more 
than an imperfect transmitter of the dominan! ideology of the ruling classes. ^ The 
present íu-tide proposes to review this subject as reflected in recent historiography 
published in Spain. 
The press, seeking to establish and/or augment its own power and importance, 
has frequently attributed to itself roles as representative zmd spokesman for the public 
at large. It would seem evident that this identification between press and general pubUc 
opinión is subject to some doubt, if not outright rejection. However, msuiy historians 
seem to accept it uncritically, using the terms "press" and "public opinión" indiscriminately 
as synonyms, and presenting the opinions of minority interest groups, political parties, 
one newspaper or even one individual journalist or contributor, as indicative of 
generalized opinión. 
On the eve of the war with the United States, the notion that the American 
"yellow" press (particularly William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal and Joseph 
Pulitzer's New York World) deliberately used false, malicious, irresponsible and 
sensationalist articles, solely with a view to increasing sales, by engaging and inflaming 
public opinión, is a commonplace in traditional interpretations of the crisis.' 
Indeed, most Spanish authors continué to lay at least part of the blame for 
Mclünle/s final decisión to intervene directly in Cuba on the "yellow" press. Even though 
the denunciation of "Spanish barbarism", resulting from the hardships inflicted on civilian 
population in Weyler's concentration camps, was to a certain extent justified and inspired 
by sincere humanitarian principies, * there is a general consensus among Spanish 
historians that the American press was manipulative and unfair in its reporting of Cuban 
issues. 
The "yellow" press in particular is characterized as immoral, hypocritical, and 
provocative for condemning Weyler's methods, for ridiculing or criticizing all things 
Spanish, for prematurely announcing the failure of the new Cuban autonomous regime 
2. Elorza, 1988, 327-8; Robles, 1991, XII, XV. 
3. Classical examples in American historiography are Marcus M. Wilkerson: Public 
Opinión and the Spanish-American War. A Study in War Propaganda. Louisiana State 
University Press, Baton Rouge, 1932, repr. Russell & Russell, New York, 1%7; Joseph 
E. Wissan: The Cuban Crisis As Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898). Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1934, repr. Octagon Books, New York, 1%5. 
4. Serrano, 1984, 28, and Elorza, 1988, 372-3, are careful to point out this fact. 
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inaug;urated in January of 1898, for maliciously reporting the affair of Spanish 
embassador Dupu/s indiscrete private letter (which contained unflattering remarles about 
McKinley), and for accusing Spain of sinking the Maine. ^ 
The Dupuy letter scandal, in early February, is seen by many as plainly 
manifesting Hearst's bad faith and the McKinley administration's exploitation of this type 
of journalism, not just because of the questionable methods and timing, but, more 
pointedly, because the principie of freedom of expression in private correspondence was 
defended only by the diplomatic corps in Washington, and not by American journalists 
themselves or by any official spokesman from the White House. * 
The definitive example of the cióse relationship between sensationalist 
journalism, popular belligerency, and political decisions must still be the reactions to the 
sinking of the Maine. Whether the press reflected or whipped up popular pressure in 
favour of a war with Spain, and both pushed the government along that path, or whether 
the government exploited smd encouraged the various manifestations of popular 
bellicosity in order to justify the final decisión to intervene in Cuba, (Serrano, 1984, 
31-32) practically all versions of the crisis coincide in that events after the explosión of 
the American warship led inexorably to war, and an aura of inevitability floats over the 
vast majority of narrations. ^  
Not all American newspapers ran sensationalist and belligerent articles merely 
to increase their sales, (Bolado, 1991, 51) but even Midwestern papers predisposed 
American public opinión towards American intervention and war with Spain, by 
dedicating a lot of attention to the Cuban conflict, by favouring Cuban rebel propaganda, 
by insistently repeating and linking humamitarian and social Darwinist ideas with the 
Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, and Anglo-Saxonism, by harping on American 
economic and strategic interests in the Caribbean, and in general by offering an 
unfavourable image of Spain. ^  
In general, the American press is deemed to have helped to créate ampie public 
support for a policy of imperialist expansión. However, the relation between press and 
pubüc opinión remains unclear. It is recognized that the United States had gradually 
5. Bermeosolo, 1962,226-33; Alonso, 1983,132; Serrano, 1984,31-3; Sevilla, 1986, 481; 
Morales Padrón, 1987, 125-6; Companys, 1987, 468-71; 1988, 330-6, and 1989, 2-4, 20, 
37-42, 139-40; Calleja, 1990, 164; Allende, 1990, 68; Bolado, 1991, 49-53, 107, 114-8; 
Navarro, 1992, 368. 
6. Serrano, 1984, 33; Companys, 1987, 467-74, and 1989, 3-4; Bolado, 1991, 106-10. 
7. In this view, Spanish authors agree with the interpretation dominant in American 
historiography. Pérez, 1989, 295-302, 317. American press coverage of this incident is 
considered to have been highly irresponsible by Bermeosolo, 1962, 228-30; Sevilla, 1986, 
485; Companys, 1989, 4, 20,37-42; Calleja, 1990,171-3; Bolado, 1991,118; Navarro, 1992, 
368. 
8. González López-Briones, 1990, makes these points in her analysis of six Indiana 
newspapers. 
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been developing economic and strategic interests in the Caribbean and the Pacific since 
the end of the War of Secession (if not long before that), and that political and 
ideological factors meant that these interests had become more intense smce the 
mid-eighties. This does not mean, however, that there was any strong popular support 
for expansionism, and here historiographical interpretations vary. Some authors contend 
that there was, indeed, such support in the 1890s,' but others, by contrast, hold that 
the American people were to a large extent deceived and mobilized by the "yellow" press.'" 
Faced with the outbresik of the Cuban war of independence in 1895, a simple 
view seems to suggest that American press and/or public opinión were ahnost entirely 
sympathetic to the Cuban rebels and to the idea of American intervention from the 
start" . 
A more careful approach reveáis, however, that in the early stages of the Cuban 
war, American public opinión was divided. Inevitably many sympathized with the Cuban 
struggle for independence, associating it with the Angloamerican rebellion of 1776, but 
more conservative sectors frowned upon the wholescale destruction of prívate property 
by the rebels, they disliked what they saw as a predominantly Negro rebellion reminiscent 
of the Haitian revolution, and they doubted that Cuban revolutionary leaders would be 
able to establish a stable government. (Navarro, 1992, 368) Nonetheless, little mention 
is made of the existence of any antiimperialist or antiinterventionist opinión in the United 
States. '^  
On the whole, then, the American people are far too simplistically portrayed in 
many Spanish versions as being ignorant about other cultures and nations, as being naive, 
uncritical and credulous, and as being unable or unwilling to distinguish or condemn 
journalistic frauds, even when blatant lies were occasionally denounced by a rival 
newspaper. '^  
However, this unsubstantiated view of American public opinión is not a failing 
exclusive to Spanish historiography. In many American versions "the onset of the wju- is 
portrayed as a function of an aroused pubhc opinión, which, as commonly acknowledged, 
need not be rational, and therefore need not be explained." (Pérez, 1989, 300) 
Equally problematic is the foUow-up notion that this press campaign and/or 
pubUc opinión effectively influenced Congress and the McKinley administration in their 
perception and handiing of the crisis and American policy. 
9. Allende, 1990, 67-8; Calleja, 1990, 193; Elizalde, 1992, 196. 
10. Bermeosolo, 1%2, 226; Companys, 1987, 468-9, 474, and 1989, 36, 42, 83; Togores, 
1990, I, 660. 
11. Bermeosolo, 1962, 226; Companys, 1987, 468-9,474, and 1989, 36, 42, 83; Togores, 
1990, I, 660. 
12. Allende, 1990, 61, 69-70, does so in a too-obvious attempt to be even-handed. 
13. Implicit in many Spanish works, this view is explicit in Companys, 1988, 327,332-9, 
and 1989, 2-4, 36, 142-3. 
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Many authors see McKinley as a weak and indecisive politician, easily swayed 
(to the point of being driven to war agadnst his wish, in some versions) by the press and 
public opinión. " This view is analogous to the interpretations that stress large-scale, 
long-term developments in economic structures, as factors determining American 
imperialism in the 1890s, in that either way, the role of presidential leadership is 
diminished. " 
Others, by contrast, envisage McKinle/s administration as simply disguising their 
true determination to intervene in Cuba. '* The relationship between presidential 
actions and the press, in this assessment, varies from suggestions that the government 
simply foUowed their own premeditated policy plans, and took advantage of sensationalist 
and Jingoistic journalism when it coincided with their own views, " to affirmations 
that the McKinley team not only were not influenced in their policy plans by public 
opinión, but, in fact, were largely responsible themselves for the growing popular 
bellicosity in the United States. '* 
Similarly, a great deal of attention has been paid to the relationship between 
public opinión and political decisions in Spain in 1898. Few would doubt the importance 
of the rising tide of nationalist and imperialist modes of thought in the case of the 
United States, but a relevant question arises concerning the degree to which the 
imperialist discourse of the late nineteenth century penetrated in Spanish opinión. 
14. Alonso, 1983, 132-3; Robles, 1986, 261; Ñíguez, 1987, 88; Companys, 1987, 466-9, 
474, and 1989, 29-30, 42, 46-48, 86, 105, 109-10, 116, 140; Calleja, 1990, 184-5, 193; 
Allende, 1990, 66-8; Togores, 1990, I, 660; Olivié, 1992, 135-7. Again, this is a common 
interpretation in American historiography. See Johnson, 1986, 56, and Pérez, 1989, 
306-12. 
15. Johnson, 1986, 55-6, argües strongly in favour of a more balanced approach which 
would recognize the historical relevance of individual actions. 
16. Pabón, 1%3, 168; Serrano, 1984, 30-33; Andrés, 1985, 20; Sevilla, 1986, 477-8; 
Companys, 1987,480, and 1989,135-6; Salas Larrazábal, 1988,594-5; Allende, 1990,66-8; 
Bolado, 1991, 57; Olivié, 1992, 135-7. This view also predominates in Cuban 
historiography. For American support of the portrayal of McKinley as designer of his 
own expansionist foreign policy, see for example Leech, Margaret. In the Days of 
McKinley. Harper, New York, 1959, Morgan, H. Wayne. Wiliiam McKinley and His 
America. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1%3, Poner, Philip S. The 
Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism. Monthly Review 
Press, New York, 1972, specially I, 287-300, and Johnson, 1986, 59-74. 
17. Sevilla, 1986, 485; Companys, 1988, 335. 
18. Companys, 1989, 83, 140, 143. It is not clear whether this last interpretation is 
simply an addition to this author's earlier versión, or whether it is offered as a new 
reconsideration of McKinle/s determined leadership. In any case, the confusión 
concerning the relationship between public opinión and McICinle/s actions is also 
discernible in American historiography. See discussion by Poner, 1972, I, 281, 287-300. 
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(RivaduUa, 1989, 189) Despite the unpopular image of an army used by the government 
to repress regionalist and working class interests, some authors contend that popular, 
patriotic bellicosity did in fact exíst in connection with overseas territories, not only in 
1898, but also during the conflict with Germany over possession of the Caroline Islands 
in 1885, and during the conflict with Morocco in 1893. " 
The general perception that American interference m the Cuban war, and 
overall conduct throughout the crisis, were immoral and profoundly offensive to Spanish 
national honour found expression in the generalized depiction of the United States as a 
pig in Spanish newspapers and in diverse popular protests, ^ and at the same time 
provoked many popular demonstrations in towns throughout Spain, often fervently 
patriotic and anti-Yankee, sometimes violent. *' It is even affirmed that the Spanish 
patriotic response to imminent war agiiinst the United States in 1898 was almost 
unanimous, (the socialists, foUowers of Pi y Margidl and the Stock Exchange being the 
few exceptions).(Robles, 1986, 281, and 1991, 110) 
A different interpretation, however, is that the popular classes were deeply 
frustrated and demoralized by the long Cuban wars. Discontent with the social injustice 
of the recruitment system, the high death rate resulting not only (or even primarily) from 
military actions, but from lack of food supplies, tropical diseases, and deñcient sanitary 
and medical attention, had undermined popular interest in conserving Cuba. Against this 
background of disillusionment and suffering, popular patriotic demonstrations were 
encouraged by the government in 1895, whereas later agitation was impulsed by the 
republican opposition, leading to questions concerning the evolution of popular opinión 
throughout the crisis. (Serrano, 1984, 90-7) Mothers of new recruits for Cuba 
demonstrated their sorrow and protest in several Spanish towns, and it eventually became 
politically advisable to forbid the families of departing recruits to accompany them on 
train stations and docks. (Fernández Muñiz, 1988, 557) Finally, the number of men 
called to military service in Cuba that obtained exemption through fraudulent means, or 
that went missing or quickly deserted increased between 1895 and 1898, offering another 
angle on popular opinión about the war. (Serrimo, 1982, 253-78, £uid 1984, 94-7) 
In this view, by early 1897 many in Spain were apparently resigned to the idea 
that defeat by the American colossus, though painful, would at least be honourable, and 
would definitively end the Cuban war. ^ The idea that large sectors of Spanish society, 
in fact, wanted peace at any price, but did not manifest this opinión because they did not 
want to appear antipatriotic, has been put forward by several authors. ^ 
19. Hernández Sandoica, 1982, 616-8, 643-4; Alonso, 1983, 130; Elorza, 1988, 353-5; 
Núñez, 1989, 232; Schulze, 1989, 271-2, 280; Elizalde, 1992, 53-4. 
20. Elorza, 1988, 354-5, 373-4; Bolado, 1991, 166-7, 187, 193. 
21. Serrano, 1981, 439-50, and 1984, 32-3, 84-5, 90-3; Elorza, 1988, 355. 
22. Elorza, 1988, 327, 360, 366, 374, 386. 
23. Serrano, 1984, 46, 131; Andrés, 1985, 20; SeviUa, 1986, 491-2; Lasa, 1991, 130-1; 
Bolado, 1991, 93-4. 
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The niceties of analyzing popular opinión are well illustrated by the violent 
demonstrations which took place in Málaga in response to McKinle/s message to 
Congress of llth April. Initially characterized as a burst of student and urban, middle 
class patriotic protest directed against the American Consulate, the mob soon took on 
a very different meaning, when popular elements began to assault property and symbols 
of the established social and political order in Spain itself. In this process, the patriotic 
and anti-Yankee message faded considerabiy. (Arcas, 1989, 289-92) 
On the other hand, it is interestmg to see that Catalonian and Basque 
businessmen supported the poUcies of pacification and retention of Cuba with a view to 
protecting their commercial privileges in the island, while Catalonian and Basque 
regionídists opposed both the Cuban and the American war, perceived as further 
expression of central government oppression of their respective nationalities. " This 
divergence between the propertied élites and the popular classes of the peripheral 
regions of Spain also emerges in the Andalusian town of Malaga. (Arcas, 1989, 283-9) 
Indeed, it is becoming increasingly evident and significant that the Spanish press 
in 1898 was a means of expression not solely of the predominant ideology of colonialist 
nationalism (characterized by patriotic exaltation, equally belligerent regarding Cuban 
independence and American intervention), but also of the profound social tensión which 
converted the colonial conflict into a general crisis in which the very essence of Spanish 
nationalism was questioned. ^ 
Nevertheless, the Spanish press and public opinión are often deemed to have 
exerted great pressure on the government in 1898, severely limiting the range of 
acceptable political options. Most Spanish authors stress the fact that the Spanish press 
vehemently condemned American aid to the Cuban rebels, and on the eve of the war of 
1898 became overwhelmingly patriotic, irrational, derisive of American military power, 
and irresponsibly optimistic about the victorious outcome of an armed conflict with the 
United States. ^ 
In the domestic context of Spanish political rivalries, American interference 
concerning Spain's handling of the Cuban rebellion induced liberal opposition 
newspapers to accuse the Cánovas government of spinelessly yielding to Yankee 
pressures, and this naturally led the conservative press to sternly deny any intention of 
permitting the United States to dictate government measures. Cuba was not considered 
a colony but an integral part of the Spanish monarchy, and therefore the predominant 
24. Elorza, 1988, 328-29, 355; Serrano, 1984, 47-64, 118-27, and 1988, 388-90; Lasa, 
1991, 109-47. 
25. Serrano, 1982, 271-2, and 1988, 391; Fernández Muñiz, 1988, 554-7. 
26. Alonso, 1983, 130; Serrano, 1984, 71-3, 84-85; SeviUa, 1986, 470, 473, 482-3, 487, 
490-91, 497, 513-14; Ñíguez, 1987, 88; Elorza, 1988, 354-5, 374, 384; Salas Larrazábal, 
1988, 596, 606; Companys, 1989, 96; Cervera, 1990, 151; Rodríguez González, 1990, I, 
633, 643, 652; Bordeje, 1990, 153-4; Téllez, 1990, 41-3; Togores, 1990, I, 667; Bolado, 
1991, 115-9, 126, 137, 141, 161; Robles, 1991, 34-119. 
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ideology prohibited not only the sale of the island to the United States, but also the 
concession of mdependence, at least as long as the rebel army remained in existence. 
Therefore there was little press support for any practical, conciliatory policies, and as 
American interference became increasingly difficult to tolérate in the early months of 
1898, the great majority of Spanish newspapers whipped themselves up into a frenzy of 
patriotic, belligerent indignation, leaving the government with very little room for 
manoevre. " 
Spanish military rhetoric was steeped in rigid patriotic belligerency and, together 
with the Spanish arm/s history of interference in government affairs, represented a 
serious obstacle to Sagasta's desperate efforts to avoid a y/ai against the United States. ^ 
Military officers saw the colonies not only as an integral part of Spanish national 
territory, which they were honour-bound to defend, but also as places in which 
professional careers could be promoted. ® For their part, the ultra-conservative 
Carlists were prone to express imperialist belligerency, and clamorously supported 
general Weyler's actions in Cuba. (Serrano, 1984, 75-9) 
The Catholic Church and Catholic workers' organizations also played an 
important role in support of the war, with a view to maintaining the eñsting colonial 
order and opposing the advance of Protestant and Masonic power. (Serrano, 1984, 48, 
64-70) The archbishop of Seville, Marcelo Spínola, made no attempt to curb his intensely 
patriotic, bellicose, anti-Liberal, anti-Masonic, anti-Protestant and anti-American 
opinions. (Ruiz Sánchez, 1988) The bishops of Barcelona, Salamanca and Malaga, 
together with the cardinal-archbishop of Valencia and the archbishop of Madrid- Alcalá 
were Ukewise staunch supporters of the war. ^ 
For their part, the left-wing Republicans, with the notable exception of paciñst 
Pi y Margall, apparently thought that disaster was imminent, and that, if the monarchy 
coUapsed in the ensuing institutional crisis, they would be better placed to take over the 
government if they could be seen to have adopted patriotic stances in the face of Cuban 
insurgency and American intervention. *' The inference from this explanation must be 
that the part/s interest in the downfall of the government and possibly of the monarchy 
itself took precedence over the foreseeable material and human costs of a war. 
27. Elorza, 1988, 327, 374, 383; Arcas, 1989, 283-4; Bolado, 1991, 61-3; Robles, 1991, 
XI. 
28. Robles, 1986, 269-71, and 1991, XII, 27, 91, 145; Serrano, 1988, 389; Companys, 
1989, 88-9. 
29. Manuel Espadas Burgos: "Le facteur outre-mer dans la formation du militaire 
espagnol." Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez. Boccard, Paris, 1978, t. XIV, and Serrano, 
1984, 48; Alvarez, 1990, 77; Bordeje, 1990, 154. 
30. Serrano, 1984, 67-9; Arcas, 1989, 284. 
31. SeviUa, 1986, 483, 491; Serrano, 1984, 79-89, 112-8, and 1988, 388-90; Arcas, 1989, 
291; Bolado, 1991, 88. 
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Only El Socialista and El Nuevo Régimen steadfastly expressed pacifist opinions 
throughout the crisis. In fact, the Spanish Socialist Party garnered considerable political 
credit in the post-war years for its opposition to the war. Internal divisions plagued the 
Party at the start of the Cuban rebellion, but by late 1897 Spanish socialists were again 
iinited and able to conduct a campaign designed to reflect and cultívate popular hostility 
to the war. '^  
Finally, anarchist newspapers, which represented an unstructured minority 
opinión in Spain, were beset by serious ideological ambivalencies regarding the Cuban 
war of 1895. On the one hand, Spanish anarchists felt that they should not support a 
rebellion whose only aim was political independence, because it had no revolutionary 
content as regards the liberation of the Cuban proletariate. The belligerent patriotism 
of the ruling classes, whether Spanish or Cuban, held no promise of improvement for the 
working class. Nevertheless, some anarchists evidently sympathized with the principie of 
armed rebellion, and gradually carne to express the hope that Cuban separatism would 
evolve into a fuU-scale social revolution. '^  
The press was not alone in the expression of patriotic valúes. Short stories and, 
in particular, theatre plays and zarzuelas (operettas), written or staged during the crisis, 
also contained these themes. However, most were penned by second-rate authors and 
none achieved a massive success, giving rise to at least the suspicion that leading 
intellectuals and creative authors were reluctant to support the patriotic ideas prevalent 
in the press, and also that the Spanish public was not overwhelmingly moved by the 
rhetoric of the stage or the press. ^ 
Surprisingly, and despite all the accumulated evidence of American expansionist 
aspirations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, several authors contend that the Spanish 
government and the Liberal press were slow to become fuUy aware of the threat, not just 
to Cuba but to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. " One must therefore pose the 
question of whether these interpretations are in fact taking government declarations and 
public attitudes at their face valué, without making the obvious critical appraisal that it 
was in the government's interest not to express its worst fears, in order to guard against 
the warnings from becoming self-fulfiUing, to avoid giving cause for popular unrest, and 
also to appear to be in all respects the unsuspecting victim of American greed and bad 
faith. 
When Sagasta finally made the decisión to declare war on the United States on 
24th April, it is often explained that the government believed that neither public opinión 
ñor the military and naval hierarchies would have accepted any other decisión. However, 
32. Serrano, 1979, 1984, 99-105, and 1988, 390-1; Elorza, 1988, 340, 353, 361, 373; 
Fernández Muñiz, 1988, 557-8; Bolado, 1991, 75-7, 93-4, 120-1, 127, 137-8, 141-2; 
Robles, 1991, 92, 113. 
33. Núñez, 1991; Serrano, 1984, 105-12, and 1988, 390-1. 
34. Serrano, 1984, 72-4; Sevilla, 1986, 490. 
35. Sevilla, 1986, 47^5, 484; Salas Larrazábal, 1988, 608. 
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a darker interpretation raises the suspicion that Sagasta's government only pretended to 
believe in the belligerent mood of the Spanish people in defense of Cuba, in order to 
justify the decisión to go to v/ai. This decisión was taken in fact, according to this view, 
in the conviction that Spsiin would be defeated, solely to save the Liberal Party and 
perhaps the monarchy from being ousted, either by a military coup or a social 
revolution.'* 
Some áuthors even go so far as to suggest that Sagasta was relieved by American 
intervention because Spain could not win the war against the rebels, and a quick defeat 
by overwhelmingly superior American forces would afford the government an honourable 
escape from the Cuban war without putting the throne at risk. '^  
The historical problems surrounding Sagasta's decisión to declare war and its 
justification in the ñame of public opinión by the government itself, by contemporary 
commentators, and often by historians, give a different meaning, although equally 
pertinent, to Perez's reflexions on Mclünle/s decisión to wage v/ai against Spain: 
"Attributed as it is to the will of the people, war serves as a metaphor for triumph of 
popular democracy. ... elected officials are obliged to acquiesce, perhaps against their 
better judgment if not against their will", and so, "political leaders are presumed iimocent 
of willing war and, by implication, absolved of responsibility for war." (Pérez, 1989, 305, 
319) Sagasta's and Mclünle/s decisions led to events which had profoundly different 
consequences for the nations involved, but both chose to absolve themselves of historical 
responsibility by appearing to bow to popular pressure. 
In order to explain the press's insistence on Spanish naval superiority and on the 
general military incapacity of the United States, on the eve of the war, opinions vary. 
One theory is that the press deliberately misled the public into thinking that Spain would 
win an immediate victory. '* Another theory is that the press itself was misinformed 
about respective Spanish and American navad strengths, and some authors suggest that 
the increasing complexity of criteria for the classification of war vessels made it difficult 
to determine with any accuracy real ñghting power. " The inference from this point 
36. Andrés, 1985, 24; Salas Larrazábal, 1988, 5%, 606; Serrano, 1988, 388; Torre, 1988 
Inglaterra, 67-125; Rivadulla, 1989, 188, 192; Cervera, 1990, 151; Togores, 1990, I, 667; 
Bolado, 1991, 127-5; Fernández Aponte, 1992, 43; Companys, 1987, 478, and 1989, 88; 
Téllez, 1990, 41, 44. 
37. Serrano, 1984, 43-6. This author states that there was a delibérate plan to go to 
war in order to lose it (author's emphasis); Serrano, 1988, 388; Torre, 1988 Inglaterra, 
67-8. 
38. This accusation is commonly, and perhaps understandably, found in the works 
written in the immediate aftermath of the war by Spanish politicians and naval officers. 
See TéUez, 1990, 41- 44; Cerezo, 1977, 274. Sevilla, 1986, 497. Nevertheless Serrano, 
1984, 71-2, supports this view. 
39. Juan B. Robert: "La prensa periódica y la Marina en 1898." RGM, mayo 1948, 579; 
Cerezo, 1977, 266-73; Cervera, 1990, 55; Bordeje, 1990, 154. Téllez, 1992, 58-65. 
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is that if official Navy reports reflected this difficulty, the press cannot be entirely 
maligned for misrepresenting Spanish naval strength. However, this can be disputed on 
the grounds that the Spanish press had consistently dedicated much attention to naval 
policy and affairs long before 1898, adopting a uniformly critical attitude of government 
measures, that complete and correct Information was available to the press from the best 
sources, and that these sources revealed Spanish naval inferiority. *" 
The belligerency of the press in 1898 and its incoherency on naval matters, must, 
then, be put down to some other factor. On the one hand, the inability of journalists to 
correctly analyze available information might have induced the sincere misconception that 
Spanish and American naval forces were reasonably balanced, simply because they were 
so dissimilar that contemporaries had some difficulty in discerning which type of navy 
would prove to be superior, the large, armoured, slower American battleships, or the 
smaller, lighter, faster Spanish armed cruisers düad torpedo ships. '^ 
On the other hand, misguided patriotism, which could not contémplate surrender 
without a fight, is also put forward as an explanation why informed peopie might 
deiiberately misrepresent the known facts. High ranking, politically influential, and well 
informed naval officers, for example, maintained optimistic views of Spjmish naval power 
in comparison with American forces, by which attitude they must be held largely 
responsible for misleading the government, the press, and in the last analysis, public 
opinión. *^ 
In conclusión, then, recent trends in works published in Spain show on the one 
hand a great interest in analyzing a wide range of sources which are presumed to be 
relevant to the study of public opinión. Newspapers and other publications of different 
ideological affiliations, creative literature, popular songs, public entertainment, teachings 
of the Church, opinions or attitudes expressed through popular demonstrations in the 
Street, meetings and associations, or resistence to military service, have all been 
examined, though these avenues of enquiry have by no means been exhausted. Private 
correspondence and personal diaries of the period have not yet been brought to bear 
with a view to adding nuances to these analyses. 
On the other hand, these contributions represent a growng awareness of the 
complex, many-layered character of public opinión in Spanish society, (though this 
awareness is strangely lacking when referring to American society), but there is still a 
tendency to avoid defining the concept of "public opinión", and therefore to deal 
superficially with the relationship between public opinión and the press. Not enough 
attention has been paid to questions concerning the extent to which public opinión might 
be simply reflected in, and/or deiiberately mobilized by, the press, or to the variability 
even in the short term of popular attitudes. 
40. Vega, 1990, 106; Rodríguez González, 1990, I, 642-3, 652. 
41. Rodríguez González, 1990, I, 634-7, 643-4, 652; Téllez, 1992, 59, 65-6. 
42. Rodríguez González, 1990, I, 638-41. 
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It is increasingly evident that, even taking into account the variety of periodical 
literature, the press does not cover the entire ideological spectrum of Spanish society at 
the end of the century. PubUc opinión and popular sentiments were not only fragmented, 
nuanced and variable but, to a large extent, often not fuUy or truly reflected in the press. 
This argument is of theoretical valué insomuch as it tends to question or even reject the 
view that public opinión can be held, in the last analysis, responsible for policy decisions 
of the government. If the conclusión is reached that public opinión was not freely and 
clearly expressed (by the press or in any other way), its relevance as a factor of historical 
causation must be greatly reduced, or at the very least carefuUy qualified. 
At the same time, ruling élites (and specifically political leaders) and the press 
(not as spokesman for "the people", but as identifiable representatives of specific interest 
groups) must be apportioned their fair share of historical responsibility for political 
decisions, in order to balance the insidious tendency to make public opinión (and by 
extensión, "the people" in general) diffusely responsible for government decisions and 
actions which were ideologically dubious and/or caused much unnecessary distress. 
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